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In the Shadow of the
“Indeterminate Speech-Act”: The
Populist Politics of Rumor in Fritz
Lang’s Early Sound Films
Florian Zappe
...the mob is the most ruthless of tyrants[.]
H. L. Mencken, “Introduction” to Nietzsche’s The Anti-Christ
A mob’s always made up of people, no matter what.
Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird
1 Rumor has it that Fritz Lang’s personal political awakening can be pinpointed to one
single  moment:  In  From Caligari  to  Hitler,  his  momentous and disputed study of  the
cinema of the Weimar Republic, first published in 1947, Siegfried Kracauer recounts a
little anecdote regarding the pre-production of Lang’s first sound film M―Eine Stadt
sucht  einen  Mörder  (1931):  “Fritz  Lang  told  me  that  in  1930,  before  M went  into
production, a short notice appeared in the press, announcing the tentative title of his
new film, Mörder unter uns (Murderer Among Us). Soon he received numerous threatening
letters and, still worse, was bluntly refused permission to use the Staaken studio for his
film” (218-219). The director was, as he told Kracauer, flabbergasted by the amount of
hostility and resistance to a film project inspired by the case of the serial killer Peter
Kürten and some other sex crimes which had been widely publicized by German media
in the late 1920s (cf.  Lang 186). The revelation came during a dispute with a studio
official during which Lang disclosed the thematic specifics of the film that he had kept
a secret up to this point. That brought about a change in the situation: “‘Ach, I see,’ the
manager said. He beamed with relief and immediately surrendered the keys of Staaken.
Lang, too, understood; while arguing with the man, he had seized his lapel and caught a
glimpse of the Nazi insignia on its reverse. ‘Murderer among us’: the Party feared to be
compromised. On that day, Lang added, he came of age politically” (Kracauer 219).
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2 Given Lang’s notorious habit of publicity-conscious self-fashioning, the trustworthiness
of  this  anecdote  is  certainly  disputable  (and  has  indeed  been  disputed  by  many
commentators), but one can certainly agree with Patrick McGilligan’s statement that
“it made a good tale and provided an early point in chronology for Lang to polish his
political credentials” (153) after he had come to America in 1934. In any case, I would
agree  that  M,  Lang’s  first  ‘talkie’,  marks  a  significant  turning point  in  the  implicit
politics of his cinema. 
3 One subtle indicator for this development is the way the film addresses the topic of
rumor.  In  the  following essay  I  will  argue  that  the  shift  from silent  to  sound film
constitutes  not  only  a  fundamental  technological  and  aesthetic  revolution  but  also
coincided with a new political focus in Lang’s oeuvre. While his earlier silent films of
the Weimar era have been accused of either being (at least aesthetically) proto-fascist
(most  notably  by  Siegfried  Kracauer)  or  deemed  as  predominantly  apolitical  (most
notably by Lang himself), some of his early sound films, produced immediately before
and after his escape from Nazi Germany (via France) to the United States, can be read
as  cautionary  tales,  equally  warning  of  and  reflecting on  the  precarity  of  liberal
democracy  when  facing  the  threat  of  a  populist  undermining  by  means  of  rumor,
gossip, and character assassination. 
4 “Liberalism,” “liberal democracy” and “populism” are, of course, notoriously contested
terms and it is impossible to recapitulate the complex debates regarding the ideological
implications of these concepts in the context of this essay. For pragmatic reasons, I will
therefore follow the concise,  pointed and applicable definition provided by Takis S.
Pappas: 
‘[L]iberalism’… revolves around the idea of individual liberty being supreme, as well
as  the  need  to  institutionally  protect  it  within  complex  political  societies.
Accordingly, when it comes to democratically run nations, a liberal democracy is
the polity that acknowledges, and is built upon, the following principles: Society
comprises  a  plurality  of  conflicting interests  which,  lest  the  polity  regress  to  a
Hobbesian nightmare of polarization and generalized social strife, must be subject
to overarching commonly agreed institutions, the rule of law, and the protection of
minority rights. Given the interdependency of such conditions, the polity ceases to
qualify as a liberal democracy even if only one of them is violated. (2-3)
5 Populism is, on the other hand, defined, at least politically, as “democratic illiberalism”
(3)―illiberal in the sense that it violates the principles outlined above, democratic in
the sense that this violation is (allegedly) legitimized by the vox populi.
6 Focusing on the examples of  M―the canonical  thriller about a child murderer who
haunts the German capital  and is  finally captured in a joint  operation of  the city’s
criminal  underworld―and  his  first  Hollywood  production  Fury  (1936)―a  revenge
drama about an innocent man who fell prey to a lynch mob―this essay will show that
the cinematic  reflection on the toxic  efficacy of  the dynamics  of  rumor provides  a
gateway  to  Lang’s  integration  into  American  liberalism.  Revisiting  and  revaluating
these films as discursive laboratories on the potentially anti-liberal politics of rumor
and  the  role  of  gossip1 in  our  current  era  of  surging  authoritarianism  shows  the
enduring topicality of these classics. 
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1. A Taxonomy of Speech-Acts
7 In his second Cinema book, Gilles Deleuze cites Lang’s M―along with John Ford’s The
Whole Town’s Talking (1935) and Joseph L. Mankiewicz’s People Will Talk (1951)―as one of
the key examples for his claim that “rumour has been a cinematographically privileged
object” (227) in sound film. Deleuze defines rumor in this context as an “indeterminate
speech-act… which circulates and spreads, making visible the live interactions between
independent  characters  and  separate  places”  (228).  Although  these  remarks  lack  a
political  perspective,  they  offer  a  propaedeutic  outlook  on  the  cinematic
representation of  the dynamics and functions of  rumor that will  be helpful  for the
political reading of M and Fury I will offer in the following.
8 Deleuze traces the prominent presence of this particular indeterminate speech-act in
the movies back to a pivotal shift  in the semiotics of cinema which is,  in turn, the
outcome of a transformation in media technology: the transition from silent to sound
film. In the silent era, the cinematic image had to be understood as a dyad “composed
from the seen image, and the intertitle which is read (second function of the eye)”
whereby the latter element also contains, in absence of a sonic component, “speech-
acts” (Deleuze 225). In terms of specific subject matter, 
[t]he visual  image shows the structure of  a  society,  its  situation,  its  places  and
functions, the attitudes and roles, the actions and reactions of the individuals, in
short, the form and the contents. And, no doubt, it grips speech-acts so tightly that
it can make us see the lamentations of the poor or the cry of the rebels. It shows the
condition  of  a  speech-act,  its  immediate  consequences  and  even  its  phonation.
(225-226)
9 The pictorial layer in silent film is purely presentational, it may show us the conditions
and contexts in which speech-acts are made but not their content―unless, of course,
we  are  proficient  lip-readers.  This  is  the  domain  of  the  textual  element―the
intertitle―that  addresses  reading,  as  the  “second  function  of  the  eye”  (besides
watching), and tells us what is said. What neither of the elements of the silent film
image  can  adequately  communicate  is  the  modality  of  speech-acts  and  their
repercussions in the social realm.
10 The advent of sound film, Deleuze continues, uncouples the speech-act from the textual
medium of  the  intertitle,  makes  it  “direct,  and recovers  the  distinctive  features  of
‘discourse’” (226). This directness of sound “takes on an area that might even be called
human interaction” (227, emphasis in the original) in a way that silent cinema was not
capable to do. It now became possible to depict all kinds of speech-acts that occur in
social  interaction,  regardless if  they are determinate or indeterminate:  Determinate
speech-acts usually originate from an identifiable source (an individual, a collective, an
institution etc.), are transmitted via established communication channels and usually
have an identifiable (individual or collective) addressee. Indeterminate speech-acts, in
contrast,  often  have  unclear  origins,  are  not  disseminated  through  preconfigured
channels and circulate in the social realm without a declared addressee. Determinate
speech-acts  usually  happen  in  already  existing  social  environments  in  which  the
modalities of what Deleuze calls “human interaction” are already defined a priori. The
indeterminate speech-act, in contrast, “through its continuous circulation, propagation
and autonomous evolution, will create the interaction between individuals or groups
who  are  far  away,  dispersed,  indifferent to  each  other”  (227,  emphasis  mine).  It
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therefore has―although lacking a preformulated telos―evocative potential as it can
lead to the emergence of new (ephemeral or sustainable) forms of sociality that define
their own modalities of human interaction (the revolutionary crowd, the mob etc.). 
11 As  “[i]nteractions  make  themselves  seen  in  speech-acts”,  sound  film  becomes,  in  its
ability to depict such acts immediately, a diagnostic tool for the observation of social
life or, as Deleuze phrased it “an interactionist sociology in action” (227, emphasis in
the original). Both films discussed in this essay, M as well as Fury, undoubtedly count as
examples par excellence for such a cinematic sociological enterprise. 
 
2. The Ideological Intricacies of Lang’s Weimar-Era
Films
12 The question of the politics of Lang’s films has to be answered in the context on the
larger discourse on the political implications of German cinema during the era of the
Weimar  Republic.  Historically,  this  discussion  is  overshadowed  by  two
names―Siegfried Kracauer and Lotte H. Eisner. Both had already been working as film
critics  in  Germany  before  they  had  to  leave  the  country  in  1933.  Their  two  most
influential contributions to the discussion of German interwar cinema were, however,
written from an ex post perspective in an attempt to historize this short but vibrant
period in the art form’s cultural history with the knowledge about the outcome of the
fascist disaster: Kracauer’s aforementioned From Caligari to Hitler was first published in
1947 and Eisner’s The Haunted Screen in 1952 (in French; the first English translation
appeared in 1969). These two books dominated the film historiography of the era for
decades and, as Christian Rogowski put it, “cast the Weimar Cinema as precursor to, or
prophet  of,  the  Third  Reich  and  as  heir  to  specifically  German  cultural  traditions,
suggesting  a  direct  correlation,  perhaps  even  a  causal  nexus,  between  cultural
production  and  historical  realities”  (1).  Of  course,  this  interpretation  has  been
contested both by contemporaries (Lang famously detested Kracauer’s book) as well as
by later film scholarship,  not least  for methodological  reasons (cf.  for example von
Moltke 45-47 or Rogowski 1-9). For the purposes of the present essay, it is not necessary
to revisit the scholarly debate for or against this dominant interpretation in detail but
it  seems  import  to  point  to  the  fact  that  it  was  very  successful  in  fostering  the
“prevailing view of Weimar Cinema as sinister auteurist cinema” (Rogowski 1) and in
establishing Lang, maybe more than Murnau or Papst, as the epitome of the masterful
Weimar-era filmmaker.
13 The idea of the cinematic auteur has, however, become a heavily contested concept in
film theory, starting with the heated debate between Pauline Kael and Andrew Sarris
(cf.  Roberts  158-164)  and the publication of  Peter  Wollen’s  Signs  and Meaning  in  the
Cinema in the late 1960s and carried on by poststructuralist film criticism in the 1970s.
If we acknowledge that the various objections against the auteur theory have at least
some degree of cogency, the question whether we can actually speak about “Lang’s”
films and, in consequence, of “Lang’s” politics arises inevitably.
14 In the context of this essay, I will follow the lead of Tom Gunning, who, in his study on
Lang,  has  found  an  equally  elegant  as  persuasive  resolution  to  this  question.  He
identifies the Fritz Lang as a cinematic author. This notion refuses to fully embrace the
axiomatic  claims formulated by critics  associated with the Cahiers  du  Cinéma in  the
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1950s under the label politique des auteurs. According to this view, there is a pantheon of
artistically  superior filmmakers (which includes Lang) “whose moral  authority over
their  work and personal  imprint  on it  made them peers  of  novelists,  painters,  and
composers”  (Brody  36)  and  whose  films  should  primarily  be  considered  to  be  the
outcome of an individual creative act. Yet on the other hand, it equally repudiates the
harsh rejection of the formative influence directors have on their films that have been
proposed by the detractors of the auteur theory in their effort to decenter the director
and relegating him or her to the role of being just one creative wheel amongst many
(screenwriters,  actors  etc.)  in  the  Fordist  machinery  of  film  production.  Gunning’s
understanding of the author is “precisely poised on the threshold of the work, evident
in the film itself,  but  also outside it,  absent except in the imprint  left  behind” (5).
Acknowledging that  “the  film medium readily  lends  itself  to  authorless  discourse,”
Gunning claims that
a director has to struggle to assert authorship, both in the making of the film and
the discourses surrounding it. An authored film shows the signs of this struggle, a
struggle by which the author may discover (and reveal to the viewer) something
other than her personality or individual ‘history, tastes and passions.’ The agon of
authorship in film invites an encounter with the language of cinema, just as the
modern author in literature encounters the drives underlying language itself.… We
can  follow  Foucault  in  claiming  that  the  biographical  person  in  effect  dies  to
produce  the  author,  as  Barthes  imagines  Proust  giving  up  his  life  in  order  to
produce the novel of his life. I will not be tracing these films back to Fritz Lang’s
life, but will rather trace the way Lang as an author, as an assembler of images and
sounds, makes his hand sensed within the very filaments of the texts.  His hand
beckons to us to enter his texts and find him, but entices us into a maze rather than
setting up a direct encounter. (5)
15 When I speak of “Lang’s” politics and “his” integration into American liberalism in the
following essay, I will consequently speak not so much about the director’s personal
political  convictions  as  about  how  they  manifest  themselves  in  the  mazes  of  his
cinematic  texts.  Lang’s  films  were  never  explicit  renderings  of  distinct  political  or
ideological  positions2 but  rather  filmic  explorations  of  fundamental  ethical  and/or
existential questions within certain political circumstances. 
16 In the case of Lang’s Weimar-era films the question of political authorship becomes
even  more  complicated  because  of  his  close  relationship  with  Thea  von  Harbou
(1888-1954), who was not only his wife from 1922 to 1933 but also his (co-)screenwriter
and collaborator in all his works between 1920 (the first cooperation was Das wandernde
Bild)  and 1933 (Das  Testament  des  Dr.  Mabuse).  Von Harbou was one of  the very few
women who had a successful career behind the camera as a screenwriter and occasional
director  in  the  German  film  industry  and  probably  the  only one  who  managed  to
maintain it through three political systems: the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany and
the early Federal Republic of Germany.
17 Given the proximity of their relationship―both privately and professionally―it seems
evident that the authorial imprint in these films is as much hers as it is Lang’s and that
any  attempt  to  disentangle  the  creative  contributions  of  the  two  individuals  must
remain fruitless. And yet, these attempts have occasionally been made, especially with
regards  to  the  politics  of  Lang’s  films  before  1933.  These  are,  to  say  the  least,
notoriously ambiguous. On the one hand, they displayed clearly anti-modernist, even
reactionary tendencies as they had a penchant for the conservative motif and story
world of German Romanticism (Der müde Tod, 1921), Germanic-nationalistic mythology
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(Die Nibelungen, 1924) or by offering a naively sentimental (yet fundamental) critique of
a fully automatized technocratic modernity (Metropolis, 1927). On the other hand, the
films  had  remarkable  diagnostic  qualities  in  their  allegorical  treatment  of  the
totalitarian  specters  haunting  the  precarious  socio-cultural  situation  of  interwar
Germany―especially in the two-part Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler (1922), its above-mentioned
sequel Das Testament des  Dr.  Mabuse and also,  as we will  see below, M. Furthermore,
Lang’s  Weimar-era  oeuvre  indeed  did  at  times  embrace  modernity’s  narrative  of
technology as a gateway to progress (Die Frau im Mond,  1929) and borrowed heavily
from the aesthetics of the modernist avant-gardes (Metropolis again, Spione, 1928) or, in
other  instances,  from  the  social  realism  (again  M)  usually  associated  with  leftist
directors like Phil Jutzi or Slatan Dudow and the German proletarian film movement
during second half of the 1920s.
18 It  is  hard to  identify  a  coherent  political  world  view in  this  cocktail  of  sometimes
contradicting  ideological  and  aesthetic  ingredients.  What  manifests  itself  in  this
ambiguity is a politically indistinct “hand” of authorship that makes itself “sensed” (in
Gunning’s sense) in the films―or, to be more precise, the hand of the synergetic co-
authorship  of  Lang  and  von  Harbou.  In  his  biography  of  the  director,  McGilligan
describes  her  as  a  “conservative  nationalist”  who  also  “demonstrated  progressive
tendencies” by being “an early, outspoken advocate of legalized abortion in Germany,
an  activist  for  reform  in  sex-discrimination  legislation  [and]  a  proponent  of  equal
rights for women” (157), just to become an avid supporter of the Nazi ideology around
1930.  Lang himself  had,  as  McGilligan concludes after  the thorough consultation of
numerous sources, indeed been “sleepwalking politically for most of the 1920s” (157)
and “did not think very long or deeply about the Nazis” as he “regarded politics as not
only beneath him, but remote from his own island-world of power and privilege” (158).
19 Lang’s cinema during the 1920s was certainly neither leaning towards the political left
nor  exhibiting  (at  least  during  the  silent  era)  a  distinct  liberal-democratic  stance,
which left it open to be co-opted by the far right. This embrace is, however, in itself
ridden with many contradictions. On the one hand, the Nazis regarded some of Lang’s
films  as  being  in  line  with  their  own  aesthetico-ideological  axioms.  Especially  Die
Nibelungen received praise from this side (cf. McGilligan 102).3 
20 The  introduction  of  sound  film  marked,  as  I  have  stated  before,  a  fundamental
transformation  of  Lang’s  cinema,  both  aesthetically  and  thematically.  Gunning  has
quite  rightly  noted that  M,  the director’s  first  venture into this  new and unknown
territory,  can  be  seen  as  the  actual  hinge  “between his  German and  his  American
career” (in spite of the fact that Das Testament des Dr. Mabuse, Lang’s last German film
for three decades, was produced two years after M) as it “ties up a number of themes
from the first part of Lang’s career… but most importantly [because] it announces new
themes  and  preoccupations”  (164).4 Indeed,  with  moving  on  to  the  ‘talkies’,  Lang
abandoned mythological and fantastic subject matter, tuned down the exuberance of
his  visual  vocabulary  and  became  increasingly  interested  in  the  psychology  of  his
characters.  And,  last  but  not  least,  there  was  a  discernible  shift  in  his  cinematic
authorship regarding the immanent politics of his work. One detail that reveals this
subtle change is the filmic depiction of rumor in M which can be read as a small but
significant  indicator  for  Lang’s  development  from  being  an  (allegedly)  politically
undetermined  filmmaker  towards  becoming  the  outspoken  “anti-fascist,  left-wing
liberal, who gave generously to support refugees, and who was not afraid of signing
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protest statements that could have given him trouble with the studios” (Elsaesser 216)
as which he was known during his time in the United States.
 
3. In Otto Normalbürger’s Court
21 Deleuze’s comments on rumor in M are, as I have already noted, completely devoid of a
political perspective, which may not come as a surprise given the fact that they are
made in reference to Noёl Burch, one of film theory’s arch-formalists. This is somewhat
regrettable. His notion of rumor as an indeterminate speech-act and of cinema as an
analytical  medium  regarding  the  dynamics  of  human  interaction  actually  invite  a
reading that focuses on the political nuances looming behind the crime story of the
child murderer Hans Beckert (Peter Lorre) whose deeds induce fear and paranoia in the
city of Berlin. In spite of the police’s efforts―the film gives a famously detailed, almost
documentary portrayal  of  the most  modern criminalistic  methods of  the time―the
hunt for the murderer is unsuccessful. Pressured by an anxious and upset public, police
forces  increase  their  activities,  led  by  Inspector  Lohmann  (Otto  Wernicke).  These
intensified  law  enforcement  activities,  in  turn,  obstruct  business  for  the  city’s
underworld. In order to reestablish the status quo ante, the organized crime syndicates
decide to conduct a parallel manhunt, led by a ringleader called Der Schränker (“the
safe-breaker”),  played by Gustav Gründgens,  who functions as  Inspector  Lohmann’s
shady  double  in  the  narrative.  The  crime  world  wins  the  race,  they  capture  the
murderer and conduct a kangaroo court, culminating in the iconic monologue in which
Beckert delivers an act of “public self-explication and confession” (Gunning 194) in
which he expounds the libidinal motivation of his deeds:
Could I  act  differently?  Haven’t  I  this  curse  inside  me? The fire,  the  voice,  the
torment!
….
Always, always I have to roam the streets and I always feel like someone is following
me… it’s me… pursuing myself. Silently… but I can hear it. Yes, sometimes I feel like
I am following myself. I want to get away, run from myself. But I can’t, can’t escape
from myself. I have to… have to take the path that I am pushed to follow… and run…
run through endless  streets.  I  want  to  disappear!  I  want  to  disappear!  And the
ghosts are running with me, ghosts of  mothers,  of  children! They will  never go
away! They will always be there! Always! Always! Always! Except… when I’m doing
it… when I…5
22 The very moment the mob of mobsters is about to lynch Beckert, the building is raided
by the police and the murderer is arrested “im Namen des Gesetzes” (“in the name of
the law”). The last scene of the film shows a regular court, sentencing him “im Namen
des Volkes” (“in the name of the people”), before cutting away immediately after the
judge uttered that phrase to the mothers of the murdered children. Ultimately, the
film’s audience never learns the official verdict.
23 If we follow Deleuze’s claim that, in the “talkie,” human interactions make themselves
seen in speech-acts (see above), many of the speech-acts that are depicted in M paint
the picture of a society in a state of exception in which human interactions are full of
pent-up tension. This becomes especially evident in the film’s depiction of rumor. Let
us  therefore  return to  the sequence that  is  central  for  Deleuze’s  remarks,  but  also
important in Gunning’s (cf. 176-177) and of course Burch’s classical interpretation (cf.
Burch  23-24):  It  starts  with  a  close-up  of  a  police  poster  headlined  “10000  Mk.
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Belohnung. Wer ist der Mörder?” (“10.000 marks in reward. Who is the murderer?“)
with a block of undecipherable text below the heading. The camera is slowly pulling
back  revealing  a  large  crowd  standing  in  front  of  the  billboard.  We  hear  various
dispersed voices (the individual speakers are not revealed as the camera only shows the
peoples’ backs) vent their horror and outrage (“Oh God, does it start again?”; “That’s
dreadful!”), followed by several voices from the back of the crowd complaining that
they can’t read the small print from a distance and calling on people in the front to
read the statement out loud. One man starts to do so but after a few sentences we hear
the voice of another man coming from the off, continuing to read the text while the
frame continues to show the crowd in front of the poster for a few more seconds. The
cut to the next shot reveals the owner of this second voice as a man who reads the
police announcement from a newspaper to four of his friends in a tavern (a clichéd
petit bourgeois German Stammtisch situation). While he is reading, two of the other men
on the table start whispering and eyeing a third one suspiciously. After the reader has
finished,  they  accuse  this  man  of―potentially―being  the  killer  on  rather
unsubstantiated grounds, as the following exchange shows:
The Accused: ‘Why are looking you at me that way?’
The Accuser: ‘Well, I guess you know that.’
The Accused: ‘What do I know?’
The Accuser: ‘Well, think! You’ll remember!’
The Accused [shouting]: ‘What do you want to say?’
The Accuser: ‘That I have seen you going up the stairs behind the little girl from the
4th floor.’
The Accused [shouting]: ‘You are crazy, you swine!’
The Accuser: ‘Who’s the swine here? Me or the one who chases little girls?’
The Accused [shouting]: ‘You bastard! You skunk!’
The Accuser [screaming]: ‘You murderer!’
24 A  fight  between  the  two  is  about  to  start  but  the  other  guests  separate  the  two
squabblers. The last insult the accused throws at the accuser (“You defamer! You damn
slanderer!”)  serves  as  a  sonic  bridge  to  the  next  scene  which  is  set  in  a  family’s
apartment. The man complains: “Such defamers! Such slanderers! And the police fall
for it!… Searching a man’s house because of an anonymous letter!” The police detective
excuses  himself,  explaining  that  he  has  to  follow  every  lead  as,  as  he  says,  “any
individual on the street could be the perpetrator.” While the audience still hears the
second half of this sentence, there is a cut to a scene depicting an elderly man who is
asked for the time by a girl, a harmless everyday occurrence which, in the paranoid
climate  of  the  society  depicted  in  the  film,  incites  a  rapidly forming  crowd  to
overpower the innocent man (one may call  it  a  citizen’s  arrest)  and calling for the
police. Another cut and we see a policeman who has just arrested a pickpocket on a bus.
This pickpocket complains: “Arresting a pickpocket is all you guys can do. Better catch
the child murderer!” The people at the bus stop just get the last word “Kindermörder”
(“child murderer”), mistake the petty criminal for the city’s public enemy number one
and the policeman has to struggle to protect him from the spurred-on mob.
25 There are several reasons why this sequence attracted so much scholarly attention. One
is certainly the sophisticated montage of overlapping sound and image that broke new
dramaturgic  grounds for  the then new medium of  the talkie.  Another reason is  its
depiction of  the mechanisms of  social  scapegoating in a  panic-fueled urban society
which is simultaneously a site of “hiding in plain sight” and of toxic paranoia-induced
denunciation: “In a succession of scenes, Lang shows four different people accused by
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their  fellow city  inhabitants.  ‘One  of  us’  becomes  ‘the  guilty  one,’  The  anonymous
crowd cloaks the murderer from detection but renders everyone suspicious” (Gunning
177). For Deleuze, this scene, to some extent, also serves as an analogy for the shift in
the semiotics of cinema through the introduction of sound film: “It will be noticed, in
the example of Lang as in many others, that the written (the poster, the newspaper) is
there to be rendered by the voice, taken up by determinate speech-acts which make
each scene go hand in hand with the next” (228). However, this progression (the man in
the front of the crowd, reading the poster; the man in the tavern reading out the same
content from a newspaper) have not only structural effects on the editing (the spoken
word  overlaps  the  cut  between  two  shots,  linking  two  different  settings  with  two
different  sets  of  characters  etc.)  but  also  on  the  social  interactions  in  the  diegetic
realities of the films. 
26 What,  then,  are  the  political  implications  of  the  human  interactions  that  reveal
themselves in the speech-acts depicted in the film? Most of the scholarship on M reads
the  film  against  the  backdrop  of  its  historical  context,  “distilling  into  the  gloomy
atmosphere of Berlin in the 1930s the climate of desperation and menacing suspense
which characterized the final years of the Weimar republic” (Secchi 1424). Indeed, the
year of the production of the film, 1930, was a pivotal year of crisis for the precarious
first  German  democracy.  The  global  economic  crisis  in  the  aftermath  of  the  stock
market crash of 1929 had hit the country hard, unemployment numbers had exploded,
the political situation was polarized and unstable (in the general election of September
1930, the NSDAP had its first major success becoming the second largest party in the
national  parliament)  and  the country  was  on  the  verge  of  slipping  towards
totalitarianism. Many scholars―again writing from an ex post perspective―read the
film against the backdrop of these developments and often focused on the character of
the  Schränker as  a  prefiguration  of  a  fascist  Führerfigur whose  “shrill  demand  that
Beckert ‘be snuffed out like a candle’… recalls Nazi rhetoric of ‘living beings unworthy
of life’” (Gunning 196).6
27 I am not disputing this line of interpretation but want to add a more universal political
reading that goes beyond the film’s specific historicity. Lang’s authorial hand makes
itself  sensed here,  for the first time in his oeuvre, as a cinematic sociologist of the
tension  between  liberal  values  and  populist  impulses  by  investigating  how  the
emergence  a  collective  affective  upsurge  undermines  one  of  the  core  principles  of
liberal democracy: the separation of powers.
28 Populisms are, regardless of their specific ideological situatedness, defined by an actual
or alleged antagonism between institutionalized power (in the hands of “the elite few”)
and  the  imaginary  collective  subject  of  “the  people,”  often  embodied  by  some
figuration of the “common man.” In spite of the fact that such categories are always
discursive  constructs,  one  cannot  avoid  assessing  that  they  are  operative  in  the
political  arena of  the public.  Animosities  of  the two camps usually  gain traction in
moments of crisis, when “the people” feel that institutional power fails.
29 M depicts exactly such a moment of crisis. A killer―a child murderer, the emblematic
incarnation of evil in every familialist society―is on the loose and the executive branch
of government seem to be unable to protect “the people” from this criminal, which is
their task according to the social contract of liberal democracy. This crisis becomes
evident  in  the  speech-acts  displayed  in  the  sequence  described  above:  The  police
poster,  reprinted  in  the  newspaper,  is  communicating  the  official  message  of
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institutional power to the public sphere, informing it of the latest murder committed
by the “ghostly fiend” (“gespenstischer Unhold”)―a disembodied, unidentified threat
it is not even able to name―and issues a warning regarding the permanent danger
from this  unknown enemy from within  (“Anyone  sitting  next  to  you  could  be  the
murderer”).  The  renderings  into  a  determinate  speech-act  of  declaiming  this
information―the  reader  ventriloquizes  the  authorities  here,  thereby  exposing  that
their  power in this  situation is  merely performative―initiates a “process of  gossip,
accusation  and  misrecognition”  (Gunning  177)  as  it  is  disseminated  in  increasingly
indeterminate  ways  in  the  public  sphere.  The  film does  not  show how the  official
information  initially  distributed  by  the  executive  via  the  media  transforms  into
malicious rumor-mongering (here is, as we will see below, a difference to Fury) but it
provides  sufficient  narrative  cues  that  such  a  shift  has  been  happening:  Two
Stammtischbrüder accusing a member of their own group to be the killer, anonymous
denunciations of innocent people, lynch mobs. The initial question posed by the police
poster (“Who is the murderer?”) is answered by a resentful public of Otto Normalbürger
(a German expression for the “common” or “everyman”) identifying themselves―not
in  a  constitutional  but  in  an  affective  sense―as  “the  people.”  Their  speech-acts
(gossiping, rumor, character assassination) and their aggressive interactions reveal a
high degree of anti-institutional resentment. And even more, we can see the evocative
potential of rumor at work when it causes random individuals spontaneously to unite
to a mob (e. g. in the case of the pickpocket on the bus) following the populist logic that
the people have to take “things in their own hands” in light of the incompetence of the
elites and their institutions. By not only taking over the function of the executive but
also of the judicative branch, “the people’s” emotionally laden collective suspends the
principles of the separation of powers and of due process, both vital cornerstones of
liberal democracy.
30 The  general  anti-institutional  and  distinctly  anti-liberal  stance  of  elevating  the
collective affects of “the people” over due process also manifests itself in the kangaroo
court which is in itself, of course, a mockery of the liberal idea of the rule of law. The
court is presided over by the Schränker, who rejects Beckert’s demand to be put before a
regular court of law in the following way:
You would like that, wouldn’t you, buddy? Just to invoke clause 51 [to this day, the
clause regulating the insanity defense in German criminal law] and to live at the
taxpayer’s expense for the rest of your life. And then you might escape or receive a
pardon. And then you’ll gleefully start chasing little children again, protected by
law through your legally attested insanity.  No, no,  we won’t have more of that.
We’ll have to dispose of you! You have to disappear!
31 The Schränker stylizes himself here as the representative of the gesundes Volksempfinden
(the commonsensical will of “the people”) and voices all the classic talking points (and
little has changed in the past 90 years) of the populist vilification of liberal ideas of law
and order: Denouncing a modern liberal penal system that also grants delinquents their
basic human rights as lenient and weak, implying a fundamental contradiction between
an allegedly  elitist  and detached concept  of  justice  in  the  judiciary  system and an
allegedly  healthy,  down-to-earth  sense  of  justice  in  “the  people,”  and,  finally
advocating for the death penalty. The film presents an antagonist to the Schränker’s
populist position, a criminal who is appointed as a “defense attorney” by the mock
court, defending the “liberal position [that] Beckert is sick and needs to be taken to an
asylum, rather than delivered to the rough justice of the mob” (Gunning 196). Lang has
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retrospectively claimed that “[i]n the mock trial with its objective discussion for and
against  capital  punishment…,  the  picture  argues  strongly  for  the  maintenance  of
democratic procedure without ifs or buts” (Lang 186). If this statement is true than the
argument  was  not  strong  enough:  Gunning  pointed  out  that  the  contemporary
reactions  to  the  film were  quite  different:  “Many viewers  and reviewers,  including
liberal or leftist journalists as well as Herr Goebbels, found the film sympathetic to the
death penalty and mob justice” (Gunning 196).
32 The film’s ethical position regarding the death penalty cannot be definitely assessed,
especially since the verdict of the official court in the final sequence of the film is not
disclosed to the audience as Lang cuts away from the judges before they deliver it. But
the  possibility  of  a  death sentence  of  course  exists  (the  penal  code  of  the  Weimar
Republic allowed for it). But it is notable that Beckert is not only the first villain in
Lang’s crime films in whom the director takes an actual psychological interest, but also
the  first  who,  ultimately,  gets  a  regular  trial  (Dr.  Mabuse  “escapes”  criminal
persecution by becoming insane, Haghi in Spione by way of suicide). In terms of the
moral-philosophical  question of  Beckert’s  culpability,  the  film remains  purposefully
undecided. It juxtaposes the liberal position of the killer rather being a pathological
than a criminal case with the illiberal position of exterminating the “evil element” to
protect the social body. The conflict between the two ideological viewpoints remains
unresolved. What is unambiguous however, is its denouncement of populist impulses
and its affirmative argument for the institutions and principles of liberal democracy:
Questions of justice have to be negotiated in a due representative process “in the name of
the  people”  and  not  directly  by  “the  people”  if  that  label  refers  to  the  populist
phantasma of a homogenous collective subject, a mob conjured up by resentful rumor
and sentiment. If one accepts McGilligan’s interpretation that M is the “first film in
which Lang had shown any curiosity about the psychology of ordinary human beings”
(221), one has to conclude that his perspective on Otto Normalbürger’s capacity of affect
control (in Norbert Elias’s sense) is rather bleak.
 
4. The Fury of Jane and John Doe
33 In  Fury,  a  film that  Gunning aptly  called “a  fully  dialectical  fable  on the nature of
American populism” (227), Lang continues his cinematic-sociological exploration of the
pernicious potency of rumor as a driving force of illiberal impulses in the social body
but  shifts  the  focus  from the  modern  European metropolis  to  small  town America
during the Great Depression. The film tells the story of Joe Wilson (Spencer Tracy), an
honest working-class character, a literal “average Joe.”7 As he passes through a small
town called Strand, he is falsely suspected of being involved in a kidnapping. While he
is waiting in jail for his exoneration, rumors about the capture of the alleged kidnapper
spread through the town and spark a lynch mob that sets fire to prison house and
finally blows it up with dynamite to cover the traces. Katherine Grant (Sylvia Sidney),
Joe’s fiancée, who has just arrived in Strand, has to witness the tragedy. Unbeknownst
to her and the rest of the townspeople, Joe survives the incident and goes into hiding.
As he is officially considered to be dead, the ringleaders of the mob are put on trial for
murder. Joe, traumatized and full of vindictiveness, hides with his brothers and follows
the trial on the radio. It seems to be a clear-cut court case: A newsreel camera team was
present and provides footage, even in close-up view, of the delinquents. In light of this
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filmic evidence, the defense attorney makes no attempts to deny the involvement of his
clients  nor  the ferocity  of  the  mob’s  actions  but  rejects  the murder charge on the
grounds that Joe’s body has never been found. Hearing that on the radio, Joe sends an
anonymous letter to the court, including his half-molten engagement ring. The letter
convinces the court of Joe’s death but stirs up suspicion in Kathrine as it contains a
misspelling that is typical for Joe. She finds out his hideout and tries to appeal to his
conscience, but he insists on his revenge. However, after a change of mind, he appears
in the courthouse just as the guilty verdicts are delivered to give “a strong speech,
excoriating the mob without absolving himself” (McGilligan 235). The happy ending is
accentuated with Joe and Katherine kissing in the final shot.
34 Just like in M, Lang devotes an extended sequence that depicts the proliferation of the
rumors  and  their  role  in  the  genesis  of  the  lynch  mob.  But  whereas  M shows  the
escalating effects of rumor by means of structural analogy (a montage of vignettes that
exemplify  the  incremental  paranoia  and  hostility  within the  public,  but  that  are
otherwise  detached  from  each  other),  Fury  portrays  this  development  in  form  of
narrative causality. We can observe the gradual escalation step by step, starting with
one  initial  determinate  speech-act:  a  barber  calls  his  wife  and  tells  her  about  a
philosophical dispute about basic questions criminality and guilt between some of his
customers.  It  was  caused  by,  as  he  frames  it,  “a  cock-and-bull  story  about  [the]
capturing one of that Peabody kidnapping gang [the gang Joe is suspected of being a
member of]” peddled by the town sheriff’s deputy. From there, the news of Joe’s arrest
spreads  like  a  virus  among  the  town’s  population  and  the  mis-en-scène  of  the
dissemination makes it obvious that the film takes a judgmental stance towards the
ferocious  dynamics  of  these  increasingly  indeterminate  speech-acts.  This  becomes
conspicuous in a scene where the image of a flock of cackling chickens is superimposed
on a group of gossiping women. Here, Lang clearly draws on the misogynist stereotype
of malicious gossip being a particularly female activity and later, he presents some of
the women as instigators of the mob violence. 
35 The fact that the sequence is explicitly gendered distinguishes it from its counterpart
in M. Gunning attributes this to the provincial setting of the film:
The rumour circulates through archetypical American small town gathering places
via  homosocial,  same  gender  groups:  men  talking  politics  at  the  barber  shop,
women gossiping over the back fence and in the kitchen or grocery market, men
growing more violent at the hardware store and eventually the bar. As opposed to
the relatively anonymous forms of mass media in the Berlin of M, information in
Strands travels orally and personally, and becomes elaborated and exaggerated in
each retelling (220).
36 The proliferation within the social realm may happen at a more interpersonal level but
rumor nevertheless remains an indeterminate speech-act as it is nonteleological and
yet evocative of violent forms of collective action conducted by previously unconnected
individuals of the town’s community. 
37 What fuels the dynamic here is not so much a crisis of executive power but a pseudo-
egalitarian and anti-elitist resentment against due judiciary process. One conversation
in a sequence, in which three of the townsmen spread distorted rumors about Joe’s
arrest is telling here:
First Man: ‘My wife’s sister called up and told her that a friend of hers told her that
this guy acted as cocky as a bronco. All he’s answer was “Let me phone my lawyer.”’
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Second Man:  ‘Sure.  That’s  the racket  of  those big-time attorneys.  Helping these
skunks beat the law.’
Third Man: ‘Well, they won’t beat it with any jury I’m ever on. If all us people had
the courage of our convictions these vermin would vanish like spit on a hot stove.’
38 Undeniably,  an echo of the Schränker reverberates in this outburst of anti-systemic,
anti-elitist  and  anti-liberal  sentiments,  culminating  in  an  inhuman  extermination
fantasy. 
39 In  the  second half  of  the  film,  the  film enacts  the  conflict  between these  populist
attitudes  and  liberal-democratic  principles  in  the  dialectical  form  of  a  classic
courtroom drama. The incorruptible district attorney sees the events in Strand not as a
temporal  regression  into  frontier-period  popular  justice  but  as  a  symptom  of  the
endemic  problem  of  lynching  in  American  culture  (in  that  regard,  Lang  had
thematically arrived in the U.S.). But like M, the film propagates the essential liberal
tenets  on which the political  institutions are based on.  “American democracy,”  the
district attorney stresses in one of his courtroom speeches, “and its system of fair play
for the rights of individuals under the law is on trial here[.]”
40 Fury, in spite of its occasional idealistic blatancy, makes a clear case for the principles
and institutions that form the ideological backbone of American liberal democracy and
thus  marks  the  arrival  of  Lang’s  cinema in  political  liberalism,  a  journey  that  had
started six years earlier with M. It  does not,  therefore,  come as a surprise that the
director regularly screened these two films “for heavily left-leaning office staff of his
independent production company in the mid-1940s” (McGilligan 228). 
 
5. Conclusion
41 In  the  two  classic  feature  films  revisited  in  this  essay,  Fritz  Lang  undertakes  a
sophisticated cinematic-sociological investigation of the populist politics of rumor. This
particular speech-act becomes central to the endeavor of explicating the fragility of
citizenship and the precarity of civic norms and procedures. In spite of the fact that the
liberal-democratic principles,  as well  as the institutions and procedures founded on
them  remain  resilient,  the  films  show  that  rumor  can  serve  as  a  catalyst  for  the
destructive imaginary of the allegedly commonsensical collective action proposed by
populism. In doing so, they offer more than just a cultural diagnosis of the specific
periods they were produced in. The dynamics they so pointedly explicate are not tied
to a particular historical moment and consequently compatible to analogous situations.
It is certainly no coincidence that Lang’s M has been remade twice, both times against
the backdrop of a surge of populist sentiments: Joseph Losey’s underrated remake from
1951 has to be considered in the context of McCarthyism and M―Eine Stadt sucht einen
Mörder,  a  six  episode  mini-series  produced  by  the  Austrian  writer-director  David
Schalko in 2019, adapts Lang’s eponymous original to grapple with the wave of right
wing demagogy that has been haunting his home country in the past decades. 
42 The efficacy of populist rumor with its inherent equation of suspicion with guilt and its
ingrained logic of privileging the anecdotal over the factual, works in transhistorical,
transnational  and  transmedial  contexts.  The  indeterminate  speech-acts  that  Lang’s
films portray share a structural similarity with contemporary hashtag-politics in their
assertory character, their lack of discursivity and their ability to invoke spontaneous
group dynamics.
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43 Central  to  both  films  discussed  in  this  essay  is  the  phantasmagoric  figure  of  the
“everyman” which usually is at the center of populist imaginaries, both from the left
and from the right. In his cinematic investigation, Lang displays a certain distrust of
this character and exposes an aporia in the idea of democracy (in whichever form)
which has been theorized since antiquity.  For Lang,  who has more than once been
labeled as somewhat of a cynic, so-called ordinary human beings, regardless if they go
by the name of Otto Normalbürger or John and Jane Doe are Janus-like figures: They are
equally the backbone of the principle of liberal democracy as well as of its greatest
foe―ochlocracy.
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NOTES
1. The distinction between the two concepts is narrow, if we follow Francis T. McAndrew: “In a
sense,  gossip  can  be  thought  of  as  a  subset  of  rumor.  Rumors  are  unsubstantiated  bits  of
information that may involve future events, people, or some other topic of collective interest.
Gossip  is  defined  more  specifically  as  a  talk  about  people.  Whether  the  information  being
discussed is true or false is irrelevant to labelling it as a gossip or rumor” (173-174). 
2. The  two  films  that  might  pose  a  notable  exception  are  Hangmen  Also  Die! (1943),  a
fictionalization of the assassination of the Nazi war criminal Reinhard Heydrich, produced in
collaboration with fellow émigré Bertolt  Brecht,  and Ministry  of  Fear (1944),  an adaptation of
Graham Greene’s novel from 1943. Given their explicit anti-Nazi stance, these two films can be
seen as Lang’s contribution to Hollywood’s war effort. 
3. The famous story―recounted by Lang numerous times in a very cinematic, screenplay-like
manner―according to which Goebbels personally offered him a high-ranking executive position
in the German film industry has been exposed as one of the self-tailored legends the director
used to peddle (cf. Werner or McGilligan 175-181). It is, however, a largely undisputed fact that
the Nazis tried to woo Lang. On the other hand, The Testament of Dr. Mabuse was among the first
films whose domestic theatrical release was blocked by the Nazi regime because of its political
overtones (cf. Kalat 76-79 and McGilligan 183-184), which bears a certain irony given the fact it
was  the  last  collaboration  between  Lang  and  von  Harbou  who,  by  that  time,  was  in  “solid
standing with the Nazis” (McGilligan 184).
4. There seems to be a tacit consensus among Lang scholars to regard Liliom―an adaptation of
Ferenc Molnár’s 1909 play that Lang made during his short period of exile in Paris in 1934―as an
irrelevant film in the transition between the director’s first (German) and second (American)
career.
5. All translations of the lines from M quoted in this essay are my own.
6. These  interpretations  are  certainly  reinforced by  the  fact  that  the  Schränker  is  played by
Gustav Gründgens (1899-1963) who later became one of Germany’s great stage impresarios. While
his artistic merits are generally acknowledged, he is also known for his fierce opportunism. He
aligned himself with the Nazis early on and had a very successful career before 1945 which he
was able to continue after the war in West Germany. He is the subject of Mephisto, Klaus Mann’s
1936 roman à clef.
7. In its early stages of production, the film had the working title Mob Rule and the character of
Joe was initially supposed to be a lawyer. Lang told Peter Bogdanovich that this idea was rejected
by a studio executive: “He [the studio executive] explained to me something I should have known
by then… everything there happens to Joe Doe [sic!]―meaning to you and me―not to some
upper-class man. And he explained to me that in an American picture one would have to have Joe
Doe―a man of the people―as a hero” (Bogdanovich 20-22).
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ABSTRACTS
Based on Gilles Deleuze’s claim that rumor has been a “cinematographically privileged object” in
early sound cinema, this essay will provide a political analysis of the representation of rumor in
two early sound films in the transnational oeuvre of Fritz Lang. This interpretation of M―Eine
Stadt sucht einen Mörder (Germany, 1931) and Lang’s first Hollywood production Fury (USA, 1936)
will  show  that  the  shift  from  silent  to  sound  cinema  marks  not  only  an  aesthetic  and
technological  innovation,  but  also  coincides  with  an  increased  political  awareness  in  the
director’s oeuvre. While his films of the silent era remain politically ambiguous and have often
been accused of foreshadowing fascist themes and aesthetics, the sound films produced shortly
before and after Lang’s emigration to the United States take a clear political stand with regards
to  the  toxic  effects  of  rumors  as  expressions  of  populist  sentiments  and,  in  this,  provide  a
gateway to the director’s integration into American liberalism. 
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